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A New Restatement-
For the International Age
MATHIAS REIMANN"
Is it time for a third restatement of conflicts? What would that third restatement
look like? How should we prepare and eventually draft it?' When conflicts scholars
discussed these questions at the Annual Meeting of the Association of American Law
Schools in New Orleans on January 9, 1999, they proffered an impressive panoply
of ideas and arguments. Yet, in the whole discussion one major consideration was
•glaringly absent: the transnational and comparative perspective. Neither the formal
papers presented,2 nor the ad hoc oral contributions, addressed the need for a new
conflicts restatement to reflect the rapid internationalization of life and law that we
have witnessed since the current text was adopted almost three decades ago. It was
almost as if conflicts issues arose solely on the domestic level.
3
Perhaps this should not come as a surprise in light of the insularity that has marked
American conflicts scholarship for most of the last fifty years. But then again,
scholars like Dean Symeon Symeonides and Professor Friedrich K. Juenger, who
both spoke at the meeting, are not exactly parochial types. In fact, they know
moreabout the international and comparative dimensions of conflicts law than almost
anyone else in this country,4 certainly including myself. But since they did not put
international perspectives on the agenda of a third restatement, I will.'
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan; Dr. iur., Universitat Freiburg (Germany)
1982; LL.M., University of Michigan 1983.
1. Professors William M. Richman and William L. Reynolds phrased the first of these
three questions. See William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Prologomenon to an
Empirical Restatement of Conflicts, 75 IND. L.J. 417, 417 (2000). I added the third; my
answers are summarized in Part V of this Comment.
2. See Friedrich K. Juenger, A Third Conflicts Restatement?, 75 IND. L.J. 403 (2000);
Richman & Reynolds, supra note 1; Symeon C. Symeonides, The Need for a Third Conflicts
Restatement (And a Proposalfor Tort Conflicts), 75 IND. L.J. 437 (2000); Louise Weinberg,
4 Structural Revision of the Conflicts Restatement, 75 IND. L.J. 475 (2000).
3. I could not attend the meeting but I read the papers presented and listened to the tape
recording of the discussion. See Audio recording ofAALS Annual Meeting (January 9, 1999),
recorded by Recorded Resources Corporation, tapes 122 and 123. The papers of Dean
Symeonides and Professors Richman & Reynolds contain virtually no reference to
international concerns. Professor Weinberg does address the extraterritorial application of
American law. See Weinberg, supra note 2, at 480. Professor Juenger duly complains about
American parochialism and hints at the special nature and needs of international dispute
resolution. See Juenger, supra note 2, at 411. However, neither scholar presents a sustained
analysis of international concerns or relates them specifically to the project of a third
restatement.
4. This is amply demonstrated by their major works. See, e.g., FRIEDRICH K. JUENGER,
CHOICE OF LAW AND MULTISTATE JUSTICE (1993); SYMEON SYMEONIDES, PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW AT THE END OF THE 20TH CENTURY: PROGRESS OR REGRESS? (1999);
SYMEON SYMEONIDES, WENDY COLLINS PERDUE & ARTHUR T. VON MEHREN, CONFLICT OF
LAWS: AMERICAN, COMPARATIVE, INTERNATIONAL (1998). Both scholars also have published
articles on foreign, comparative, and international conflicts law that are too numerous to
mention.
5. In other contexts, Professor Juenger has repeatedly called for an international and
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What I have to say is plain and straightforward. (1) The Second Restatement is
largely blind to international'concems, mainly because it is a legacy of the heyday of
parochialism in American conflicts theory. (II) Since the Restatement's adoption,
however, international issues have become routine, primarily in the real world of
legal practice. (III) In that regard, the Second Restatement, like much of our current
conflicts theory, is out of date; our need to catch up with real world developments is
a strong argument in favor of drafting a successor. (IV) If we engage in such an
adventure, we must ensure that a third restatement will be thoroughly informed by
international perspectives. (V) Otherwise, the legal theories expressed therein would
be irrelevant for a large and ever increasing share of cases.
I. THE LEGACY OF PAROCHIALISM
The SecondRestatement displays a provincial attitude towards conflict of laws. Its
principles and rules are admittedly drawn from interstate cases6 and they are designed
for the interstate, that is domestic, context. The Restatement postulates that these
domestic principles and rules apply to disputes involving foreign nations as well,
because there are no fundamental differences between interstate and international
cases. While the Second Restatement does alert the reader to the fact that every once
in a while, such differences may arise, it regards these differences as limited to
particular instances and gives them extremely short shrift.7 As a consequence, the
Second Restatement contains very few references to, and even fewer rules about,
international conflicts. It hints at them vaguely in some of its introductory sections,8
briefly mentions that international law may limit personal jurisdiction,9 deals with the
recognition of foreign nation judgments,"0 and contains a section about notice and
comparative approach to conflicts law, most recently in Friedrich K. Juenger, The Needfor a
Comparative Approach to Choice-of-Law Problems, 73 TUL. L. REV. 1309 (1999).
6. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 10 cmt. a (1971) [hereinafter
SECOND RESTATEMENT].
7. Id. § 10 cmts. c and d. Comment d lists four such considerations which seem to be
really just two: greater political, social, and cultural differences on the international level ((I)
and (4)) and non-applicability of certain constitutional provisions ((2) and (3)).
8. See id. § 1 (recognizing that the world is composed of territorial states though that
hardly needs restating). Section 3 defines the word "state" in a way that includes both states
within the Union and foreign countries. See id. § 3. However, comment e also announces that
the word "nation" will be used specifically for foreign countries. See id. § 3 cmt. e. Section
6(a)(2) mentions "the needs ofthe interstate and international systems"as one of seven Choice-
of-Law Principles, but neither the section itself nor comment d draws any distinction between
interstate and international systems needs or tells the reader what exactly these needs
are. See id. § 6(a)(2). Such needs are mentioned again in section 247 comment a, but left
completely undefined there as well. See id. § 247 cmt. a.
9. See id. §§ 83, 92 cmt. g; see also id. § 31 cmt. a (distinguishing between the United
States, the states of the Union, and foreign countries).
10. See id. § 98. There are references to foreign nation judgements in the comments to
various other sections as well. See id.§§ 31 cmt. c, 100 cmt. d, 102 cmt. g, 115 cmt. f, 117
cmt. c. However, they simply repeat the basic rule that the Full Faith and Credit Clause does
not apply in this context.
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proof of foreign law." That's about it. 2 All in all, the Second Restatement allocates
less than two percent (about 20 of its over 1200 pages) of text and comment to issues
involving foreign countries. The bulk ofthe text, especially the part on choice-of-law,
is almost completely devoid of international perspectives. To put it bluntly, from the
Second Restatement's point of view, it does not matter whether the choice is between
the law of New York and New Hampshire or between the law of New York and New
Guinea.
This insular approach is neither the fault of the principal draftsman nor accidental.
Instead, the Second Restatement, like all such documents or codifications, is a child
of its time. We can see this more clearly if we consider its place in the history of
American conflicts scholarship. There is no need here for a full-fledged rendition of
that history, particularly since others have already told it.'3 It will suffice here quickly
to consider whence our discipline came, where it stood in the 1950s through the
1970s, and where it might be headed now.
As far as the significance of international and comparative perspectives is
concerned, we can distinguish several periods. The first began with the foundation
of the conflicts discipline in this country, with the work of Joseph Story. During the
first hundred years, scholars conceived of conflicts law primarily as part and parcel
of international law, namely the part that deals with private entitlements and
litigation. Story thus christened the discipline "private international law."'4 As the
name indicates, and a casual look at Story's, or even Joseph Beale's works illustrates,
it was a discipline rich in international and comparative perspectives.' A new era
began in the 1950s, under the influence of Legal Realism. In this second phase,
conflicts scholars no longer saw their discipline as part of international, but of
domestic American, law. Their focus narrowed to the interstate perspective and they
developed their various theories in isolation from the rest of the world.'6 As a result,
conflicts law almost completely lost its comparative and international perspectives. 7
l1. See id. § 136.
12. There are casual references to international law or foreign legal systems in a few other
places. See id. §§ 13 cmt. a, 60 cmt. b, 299 cmt. f, 387 cmt. h; see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICTOF LAWS: ADMINISTRATIVE ESTATES, Introductory Note at 356 (1971).
However, they are so insignificant that they are barely worth mentioning.
13. See Juenger, supra note 5 (providing the most recent historical overview); see also
JUENGER, supra note 4, at 88-146.
14. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 9 (Morris L. Cohen et
al., eds., Arno Press 1972) (1834).
15. See id. at xi-xiv (providing a list of authors cited); JOSEPH BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS at xi-lxxx (1916).
16. This was already noted by foreign observers at the time. Gerhard Kegel spoke of
American conflicts theorists "cooking in their ownjuice." Gerhard Kegel, Wandel aufdannem
Eis, in FRIEDRICH K. JUENGER, ZUM WANDEL DES INTERNATIONALEN PRIVATRECHTS 35, 41
(1974).
17. It is often overlooked that Legal Realism turned not only American conflicts theory,
but also most of American legal scholarship inward. The international and comparative
perspectives that were quite prevalent in the decades before, were by and large abandoned in
the 1930s and 1940s, in part in reaction to totalitarianism in Europe, and in part as a result of
the Realist obsession with the process of appellate adjudication specifically in the United
States. This entailed a loss of cosmopolitan perspective from which American legal thought
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This phase lasted until very recently. In the last ten years or so, we may have moved
on to yet another period, although it is too early to tell for sure. Be that as it may, the
present situation in American conflicts scholarship is marked not only by exhaustion
after the turmoil of the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, but also by a rekindled interest in
comparative and transnational perspectives. We have begun to look beyond American
borders once again."
This brief sketch shows that the Second Restatement is a product not only of the so-
called "conflicts revolution" but also of the simultaneous heyday of parochialism in
American conflicts theory. The 1950s and 1960s were the time when interest in
foreign law and transnational issues was at an all-time low among American conflicts
thinkers. It is true that there have always been scholars in the United States who
looked beyond American borders,' 9 but they'had relatively little influence on the
mainstream of American conflicts law in this second phase." Moreover, Willis Reese,
the SecondRestatement's principal draftsman, was not a member of this cosmopolitan
group. International and comparative sophistication were not among his many
strengths as a scholar.2' Reese was a representative of the "curiously
has not yet fully recovered.
18. See JUENGER, supra note 4, at 26-27 (noting growing comparative interest in American
conflicts scholarship); see also infra text accompanying notes 29-34, 36-38.
19. Among the previous generation, Albert Ehrenzweig, Kurt Nadelmann, and Hessel N.
Yntema come to mind. One might also include Ernst Rabel who, though not an American,
wrote his magisterial treatise at the University of Michigan. ERNST RABEL, THE CONFLICT OF
LAWS, A COMPARATIVE STUDY (1945-1958). Among the present, though by now older,
generation, Peter Hay, Friedrich K. Juenger, Andreas Lowenfield, and Arthur T. von Mehren,
among others, have maintained a comparative and international perspective.
20. Albert Ehrenzweig, for example, repeatedly demanded that international cases be
treated differently from interstate ones. See ALBERTA. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICTOF LAWS 16-
21 (1962); Albert A. Ehrenzweig, Interstate and International Conflicts Law: A Plea for
Segregation, 41 MINN. L. REV. 717 (1957). He actually co-authored a multivolume treatise on
international conflicts law. See ALBERT A. EHRENZWEIG & ERIK JAYME, PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW (3 vols. 1967-1977). However, it seems that his work in this area was
largely ignored even during his lifetime; today it is all but forgotten.
21. Reese himself confessed ignorance about foreign conflicts rules. Willis L.M. Reese,
General Course on Private International Law, 150 RECUEIL DES CouRs 1, 9 (1976). Fewer
than a handful of the articles he published dealt with international matters. See id. at 6-7. Nor
is there any evidence, as far as I know, suggesting that he studied foreign models in drafting
the Second Restatement. It is true that he knew something about English law and was cognizant
of its proper-law approach to contract conflicts. See Willis L.M. Reese, Contracts and the
Restatement of Laws Second, 9 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 531, 537, 540-41 (1960) (referencing
English law). However, he seems to have paid little attention to most of the rest of the world.
As far as I can see, the Second Restatement mentions only one foreign country, the United
Kingdom-twice. SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, §§ 3 cmt. a, 278 cmt. e.
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omphaloscopic"' period of American conflicts scholarship; he thought
overwhelmingly in domestic terms and accordingly produced an insular
Restatement.23 Viewed from this perspective, it even made sense, at least at the time.
II. MEANWHILE IN PRACTICE...
When the Second Restatement was adopted, international issues played a marginal
role in American conflicts law. In the thirty years since, their importance has
increased continuously and dramatically. Today they represent a substantial and
integral part of our discipline.
As usual, the changes occurred first in the real world. Suffice it to point to three
major developments in legal practice. The first concerns quantity. As we all know,
the number of international disputes has grown continuously in the last few decades.
In the 1960s, they were rather exotic exceptions; by the end of the century they are
routine fare. The second development took place in the courts' attitude toward
international cases. Conflicts decisions from the 1950s through the early 1970s
tended to ignore the fact that the other jurisdiction involved was not an American
state but a foreign country.24 This began to change the year after the Second
Restatement was published. In The Bremen v. Zapata Offshore Co,,2" the United
States Supreme Court brushed parochial worries aside and enthusiastically embraced
an internationalist attitude. The decision turned out to be a trendsetter. In subsequent
cases, the Court has emphasized the unique nature of international disputes time and
again, liberating the law of international arbitration from traditional constraints26 or
tailoring specific rules for foreign litigants.27 Similar observations can be made in
many lower courts. While the judicial track record in international cases is far from
perfect, judges today are much more aware of the specific problems posed by these
22. The term is, of course, Fritz Juenger's. See Juenger, supra note 2, at 411.
23. See SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 10 reporter's note (recognizing that
American courts and writers have, by and large, not distinguished between international ana
interstate cases for choice of law purposes).
24. We are all familiar with such classics as Hurtado v. Superior Court, 522 P.2d 666,
670-81 (Cal. 1974), Milkovich v. Saari, 203 N.W.2d 408, 412-17 (Minn. 1973) (involving
Ontario and Minnesota), Neumeier v. Kuehner, 286 N.E.2d 454, 456-58 (N.Y. 1972)
(involving Ontario and New York), Babcok v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279,283-89 (N.Y. 1963)
(involving Ontario and New York), and Auten v. Auten, 124 N.E.2d 99, 101-03 (N.Y. 1954)
(involving England and New York).
25. 407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972) (upholding the selection of England as the forum in a contract
between an American and a German party).
26. See Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros S.A. v. MN Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 537-39
(1995); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,629, 638-40
(1985); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506,519-20 (1974). As Patrick J. Borchers has
pointed out, the Court eventually extended the liberal attitude first displayed in international
cases to purely American disputes. See Patrick J. Borchers, The Internationalization of
Contractual Conflicts Law, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 421, 440 (1995).
27. In Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 114-16 (1987), the Court
hinted at greater due process protection for foreign defendants. In Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno,
454 U.S. 235, 256 (198 1), it held that suits can be dismissed more easily under the doctrine of
forum non conveniens when the plaintiff is a foreigner.
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disputes than they were a generation ago.21 The third development is the rise of new
international issues that were either unknown or at least not prominent thirty years
ago. Today, courts must determine not only theirjurisdiction over foreign parties, the
applicability of foreign law, or the recognition offoreignjudgments. They must also
deal with multiple conventions affecting private entitlements,29 hear human rights
claims,3" construe the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act,3 determine the
extraterritorial application of a host of regulatory statutes, 32 consider antisuit
injunctions involving parallel litigation abroad,33 and decide forum non conveniens
motions involving foreign parties in hundreds of cases every year.34 Consider the
combined effect of these changes-in quantity of cases, judicial attitude, and the
nature of issues-and it becomes obvious that international conflicts law today just
isn't what it was in 1970.
Conflicts scholarship and teaching have begun to react to this evolution, albeit with
a considerable time lag. In marked contrast to the 1950s through the 1970s, when
28. Of course, this is no guarantee that these concerns will always receive due
consideration. Even the United States Supreme Court all but disregarded the international
nature of the dispute in Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408,414-16,
418-19 (1983).
29. See, e.g., Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 707-08
(1988) (referring to the Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial
Documents in Civil and Commercial Matters, Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361, T.I.A.S. No.
6638); Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States, 482 U.S. 522, 539-41
(1987) (referring to the Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial
Matters, March 18, 1970,23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444). Recently, American courts have
also become increasingly concerned with the Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods, April 11, 1980, 19 I.L.M. 668. See Harry M. Flechtner, More U.S. Decisions
on the UN. Sales Convention, 14 J.L. & CoM. 153 (1995). In addition, the Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517,
T.I.A.S. No. 6997, has been interpreted through case law for several decades. See, e.g., Vimar
Seguros, 515 U.S. at 538; Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 619 n.3, 631, 638; Scherk, 417
U.S. at 519-20 nn.14-15.
30. The best-known example is Filartiga v. Pena Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1980)
(finding torture is contrary to international law). See also Siderman de Blake v. Republic of
Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 722 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding the U.S. court had possible jurisdiction
over Argentina on allegation of torture).
31. See 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1330, 1602-1611 (West 1993, 1994, & Supp. 1999); see also Saudi
Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 356-63 (1993); Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504
U.S. 607, 612-20 (1992).
32. See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 795-99 (1993); EEOC v.
Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 255-59 (1991); Mannington Mills Inc. v. Congoleum
Corp., 595 F.2d)1287, 1297-98 (3d Cir. 1979); Timberland Lumber Co. v. Bank of America,
549 F.2d 597, 608-12, 615 (9th Cir. 1976); Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell,
468 F.2d 1326, 1333-34 (2d Cir. 1972).
33. See, e.g., Allendale Mutual Ins. v. Bull Data Sys., Inc., 10 F.3d 425, 432-33 (7th Cir.
1993); China Trade & Dev. Corp. v. M.V. Choong Yong, 837 F.2d 33, 37 (2d Cir. 1987);
Laker Airways v. Sabena, 731 F.2d 909, 926-34 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
34. See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235,256 (1981); In re Union Carbide
Corp., 809 F.2d 195, 202-03 (2d Cir. 1987).
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academic work on international conflicts law was rare,35 the literature in this field has
grown to impressive proportions in the 1980s and 1990s. Virtually every topic
mentioned in the previous paragraph has been written well-nigh to death. Today,
there is a veritable surplus of international and comparative law joumals publishing
dozens of articles about international conflicts issues year after year. Most modem
conflicts casebooks include foreign and transnational perspectives3 6 and teachers are
beginning to include them in their courses. 7 Conflicts scholars have even created an
entirely new sub-discipline focusing exclusively on international matters, called it
"international litigation," and fumished it with its own courses, casebooks and
textbooks. 8 To be sure, much remains to be done. We have no current comparative
study of the caliber of Rabel's work. 9 Much of the academic literature is shallow,
redundant, or both, and insular attitudes are far from extinct in American conflicts
scholarship. But on the whole, we have made considerable progress in overcoming
the parochialism of the previous decades.
III. THE NEED To CATCH UP
In suggesting that we begin to work on a successor text, Dean Symeonides has
called the Second Restatement "dated," and pointed out "that it is virtually silent on
or inadequate for many of the conflicts which have been increasingly occupying
American courts in the last two decades and which will continue to do so in the
future.... "4" As illustrations, he mentions the Second Restatement' s inadequacy on
issues such as interet use, insurance coverage for environmental pollution, "mega
torts," and punitive damages.4 All this is true.
But as the previous Part has shown, the Second Restatement is also hopelessly
behind the times with respect to the internationalization of private law and litigation,
both on account of its inherent parochialism and of its age.4" Check its provisions
against the situation in the legal world and you will see that the Second Restatement
35. But see supra text accompanying notes 19-20.
36. See, e.g., LFiA BRILMAYER, CONFLICTOF LAWS: CASESAND MATERIALS 885-972 (4th
ed. 1995); ROGER C. CRAMTONETAL., CONFLICTOF LAWS 644-717 (5th ed. 1993); ANDREAS
F. LOWENFELD, CONFLICT OF LAWS: FEDERAL, STATE, AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES
869-1007 (2d ed. 1998); MAURICE ROSENBERGETAL., CONFLICTOF LAWS 726-756 (10th ed.
1996); SYMEONIDES, supra note 4, at 543-601, 699-739, 854-91.
37. See Editor's Introduction, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 359, 359 (1995) (introducing
the Symposium on the Conflict of Laws in the Global Village: International Conflicts Issues
for the General Course in Conflict of Laws).
38. See GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS
(1996); ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION (1993);
VED P. NANDA & DAVID K. PANSIUS, LITIGATION OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES IN U.S.
COURTS (1986); LAWRENCE W. NEWMAN & DAVID ZASLOWSKY., LITIGATING
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL DISPUTES (1996); LOUISE ELLEN TEITz, TRANSNATIONAL
LITIGATION (1996); RUSSEL WEINTRAUB, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION (2d
ed. 1994). In addition, there are a large number of practitioner manuals.
39. See RABEL, supra note 19.
40. Symeonides, supra note 2, at 441.
41. Id.
42. See supra Part II.
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simply fails to address most of the problems that currently plague the courts in
international cases. It tells the bench and bar nothing about the degree of due process
protection for foreign defendants, service of process abroad, arbitration of
transnational disputes, suits against foreign sovereigns, human rights claims,
international conventions, antitrust enforcement overseas, injunctions against foreign
litigants from proceeding in their own courts, or discovery of evidence in foreign
countries. From the perspective of modem transnational litigation, the Second
Restatement is not only close to useless, it is a vestige from a bygone era.
Of course, one could respond that these international issues are so idiosyncratic that
they are not really conflicts problems to begin with. It is true that some of them are
not conflicts issues as defined by the Second Restatement, which limits the field to
the time-honored questions of personal jurisdiction, choice of law, and judgments
recognition.43 Thus, one might argue, a conflicts restatement does not have to address
these issues, particularly since some of them are dealt with in the Restatement (Third)
of Foreign Relations Law of the United States." Yet, such an argument would be
completely wrong-headed. It is now a fact of life that these international issues arise
all the time in private transboundary disputes. At their core, they are not issues of
American foreign relations (though they touch on them), but of international civil
litigation. In short, they have become part of the conflicts menu, whether we like it
or not. If they transcend the classical notion of conflicts law, the appropriate response
is not to shut them out but to adjust the traditional concept of our discipline to fit the
real world.
Thus, mainstream conflicts law needs to catch up with the realities of the much-
trumpeted global age. This need is a clear argument in favor of moving beyond the
parochialism of the Second Restatement. I am not convinced that international
concerns alone are a sufficient reason to engage in the formidable task of drafting a
successor, nor am I sure how much weight these concerns carry in relation to other
arguments for or against such an endeavor. But let me proffer three reasons why the
catch-up argument should be taken seriously.
First, preparing a third restatement will provide a good opportunity to bring our
conflicts theory and practice up to speed for the ongoing internationalization of law.
It will force us to take stock of what we have, to determine what we lack, and to
decide what we want. What we currently have is largely a parochial blend of old-
fashioned territorialism and the fruits of the "conflicts revolution."4 What we lack
is a profound understanding of international concerns; and what we should want is
a clear statement of the principles and rules that reflect these concerns. There is
plentiful material to work with. As I have pointed out, we have thirty rich years of
case law, conventions, statutes, and scholarship about international conflicts law. We
also have much greater agreement in most international questions than we ever had
in domestic cases when the Second Restatement was in the making. Thus there is a
lot to restate, and restating it should not be all that hard.
Second, if we succeed in drafting sound principles and rules for international
43. SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 2 cmt. a.
44. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA §§ 401-488 (1987).
45. See supra Part I.
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disputes, our product would greatly benefit legal practice. Of course, the bench and
bar have handled international disputes for decades without help from the Second
Restatement, and there is no indication that they have done worse than in domestic
cases with its assistance. Still, a set of internationally oriented rules in a third
restatement could be very valuable, in practical, as well as psychological ways.
Practically, it would allow quick orientation for busy practitioners, serve as a starting
point for further analysis and research, and provide a place to gather relevant material
and to list references. Let us not forget that the vast majority ofJudges, especially in
the state courts, do not have the time, the resources, or the interest to become
specialists in international litigation. As their dockets include more and more such
litigation, they need all the help they can get. Psychologically, a third conflicts
restatement adequately addressing international issues would constantly remind
counsel and judges that transnational disputes pose special problems and must be
handled with particular care. Much of what is needed in such cases is a matter of
awareness and attitude, and a restatement is more likely than academic scholarship
to affect the way practitioners approach real world controversies.
The final reason for taking the catch-up argument seriously is simply that the
argument becomes more powerful as time goes on. As the importance of international
issues keeps growing, the Second Restatement keeps falling further behind and the
need to move on becomes more pressing. Even if we start drafting a successor
document tomorrow, it will not be adopted for at least another decade. By then, the
Second Restatement will probably be no more than an artifact from a parochial age
half-a-century ago-an era of which few active conflicts scholars will have any
personal recollection.46
IV. INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES
IN A THIRD RESTATEMENT: A SHORT WISHLIST
Ifwe actually decide to draft a new restatement, how should we go about it in order
to ensure that the final product meets current and future needs in international
disputes? The essential steps should be pretty obvious. As a preliminary matter, we
must take stock of the specific international issues, cases, conventions, and other
materials that a new restatement would have to address. Then we need to decide
whether we want to separate them from the rest or integrate them with it. The answer
might depend on how clearly distinct international concerns are, and since that varies,
we may want to separate some and integrate others.47 Finally, we must, of course,
draft principles and rules that both reflect what the law currently is in international
46. Of course, this argument rests on the assumption that the current internationalization
of society and economy, and thus of law, will continue. I am not as sure of that as most of my
contemporaries seem to be. Having been trained as a legal historian, I can think of times in the
past in which similar internationalization processes came to an abrupt and grinding halt and
were followed by periods of renewed isolationism, for political or other reasons. But at least
for the time being, we have little choice but to assume a further increase of transnational
disputes in the near future and to prepare for it.
47. For example, the extraterritorial application of American law is a specific international
issue, while choice of law involving foreign countries does not invite treatment in a separate
chapter. The recognition of foreign country judgments may lie somewhere in the middle.
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disputes and suggest a direction in which it should develop. But beyond these basic
steps, I have three wishes. I realize that nobody has granted them to me, thus I offer
them only as food for further thought.
My first wish is that the drafters of a third restatement consider every principle and
rule they devise not only in light of domestic scenarios but of international disputes
as well. The main reason is that we can no longer afford to treat international cases
as exceptions. They have become so frequent and significant that they cannot be
safely relegated to a few isolated rules. A third restatement should come with an
implied (or better yet express) warranty that all its principles and rules are fit for
international use as well.
This is particularly important since international cases often present idiosyncratic
challenges.4" It is tempting to assume that whatever works (if it does) between
California and Nevada will also work between California and Mexico, but it is no
great news that that assumption is often wrong.49 In many contexts, such as
international jurisdiction, arbitration, orjudgment recognition, this is too well known
to belabor. But even at the very core of our discipline, in choice of law, cases
transcending United States borders raise unique issues. Classic illustrations include
the extraterritorial application ofAmerican regulatory statutes 0 and the foreign policy
implications of international conflicts disputes."' Today, we also have to ensure the
compatibility of choice-of-law rules with international trade agreements such as the
WTO or NAFTA, and we have to explore the significance of emerging private law
regimes on the supranational level, be they conventions like the CISG or texts without
official authority like the UNIDROIT principles.52
Beyond all these international concerns, there is another, purely domestic, reason
to consider every principle and rule in an international light. As Patrick Borchers has
pointed out, transnational disputes bring the problems and deficiencies of conflicts
rules into sharper relief 3 We have known this for a long time with regard to the
public policy exception, the use of which is particularly tempting, but also
particularly dangerous, in international cases.5 4 We can observe much the same
48. For a general overview of special considerations in international, as opposed to
domestic, American conflicts cases, see MATHIAS REIMANN, CONFLICTOF LAWS IN WESTERN
EUROPE: A GUIDE THROUGH THE JUNGLE 19-36 (1995).
49. See, e.g., Patrick J. Borchers, The Internationalization of Contractual Conflicts Law,
28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 421, 431 (1995) (urging to resistthe temptation to transplant ideas
conceived for domestic cases to the international context); Juenger, supra note 2, at 414
(pointing out differences between domestic and international cases).
50. See supra note 32.
51. See Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,
376 U.S. 398 (1964).
52. See UNIDROIT, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS (1994).
A third restatement should, for example, tackle the issue whether parties can choose such a set
of international rules instead of a national law. See Barton S. Selden, Lex Mercatoria in
European and US. Trade Practice: Time To Take a Closer Look, ANN. SURV. INT'L COMP. L.,
Fall 1995, at I 1l.
53. See Borchers, supra note 49, at 431.
54. Since the political, economic, and cultural differences tend to be greater in international
than in domestic scenarios, public policy issues present themselves more starkly: on the one
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exacerbation of dilemmas with regard to choice-of-law clauses,"5 interest analysis,
6
or the lex fori approach, 7 to name just a few examples. In short, international cases
provide an opportunity to test the soundness of all rules under particularly tough
conditions.
My second wish is that the drafters of a third restatement work comparatively, that
they look at foreign conflicts law, thus reviving the tradition of Story to Beale. The
material is extraordinarily rich. Especially in Europe, most countries have recently
reworked their conflicts law, often (re-)codifying it, as in Austria," Germany,5 9
Italy,6' Switzerland, 6' the Netherlands,62 and even in England,6 not to mention the
hand, foreign rules are more often objectionable, on the other hand, the need for sensitivity and
tolerance is particularly great in cases involving alien cultures. For a vivid, and by now almost
classic, illustration, see In re Dalip Singh Bir's Estate, 188 P.2d 499 (Cal. Ct. App. 1948)
(establishing that public policy against polygamy prohibits in-state cohabitation with more than
one wife but not succession of several wives upon the husband's death).
55. For example, the time-honored issue whether two parties from different jurisdictions
should be allowed to choose the law ofanonrelatedthirdjurisdiction comes into sharper relief
when the parties are from different countries. On the one hand, the parties' need for a neutral
regime is more legitimate in an international setting, while on the other hand, the danger of
abuse is considerably greater. For a lively debate about the appropriate limits of party
autonomy, see Patrick J. Borchers, The Internationalization of Contractual Conflicts Law, 28
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 421 apps. a, b (1995) (Letter from Friedrich K. Juenger to Harry C.
Sigman, Esq. (June 23, 1994); Letter from Larry Kramer to Harry C. Sigman, Esq. (Aug. 4,
1994)).
56. It is risky enough to define the interests underlying the rules of another state within the
United States but to ascertain these interests in case of a faraway, foreign country with a
different language, political system, and notion ofjustice, is skating on terribly thin ice. Also,
if American courts do not have a mandate to balance even the interests of sister states, see
BRAiNERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYSONTHE CONFLICTOF LAWS 181-82 (1963), they surely
have no business weighing the interests of foreign nations. And if comparing the impairment
of state interests is questionable business for an American judge, telling a foreign country that
its interests are not all that affected, can easily become preposterous.
57. Witness that its advantages-ease of application and a lower likelihood of error-are
much greater in international than in domestic cases, but so are its downsides: disregard of
legitimate party expectations, violation of foreign state interests, and invitation to blatant
forum-shopping.
58. See Bundesgestetz vom 15. Juni 1978 fiber das internationale Privatrecht
Bundesgesetzblatt No. 304/1978. For an introduction and translation of Austrian law, see E.
Palmer, The Austrian Codification of Conflict of Laws, 28 AM. J. COM. L. 197 (1980).
59. See Gesetz zur Neuregelung des intemationalen Privatrechts, v. 25.7.86
(BGB .IS. 1142) (Private International Law Revision Act). For an introduction and translation
of the German law, see Rainer Gildeggen & Jochen Langkeit, The New Conflict ofLaws Code
Provisions of the Federal Republic of Germany, 17 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 229, 237-59
(1987).
60. See legge 31 maggio 1995, n.218, Riforma des sistema italiano di diritto intemazionale
privato (Law of March 31, 1995, Reform of the Italian System of Private International Law),
Gazetta Unifficiale, Parte Prima, 3 guigno 1995.
61. See Bundesgesetz flber das Internationale Privatrecht vom. 18. Dezember 1987 (Federal
Law on Private International Law of December 18, 1987). For an introduction to the Swiss law
see Symeon C. Symeonides, The New Swiss Conflicts Codification: An Introduction, 37 AM.
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regimes on the European level, that is, the Brussels and Rome Conventions.' In
addition, the drafters of a new restatement should consider conflicts law and
scholarship in Latin America, Asia, and other parts of the world."5 Again, I can think
of several reasons why this would be a good idea.
Most obviously, foreign conflicts regimes are a rich source of inspiration and
guidance. It is true that the purpose of a third restatement would be to represent
American law, not the rules prevailing in other countries. But in every restatement,
there is a normative element, that is a preference for one solution over another, and
a general push in a particular direction. In making the inevitable choices, it would be
imprudent, to say the least, to ignore the experience gathered abroad. This experience
is particularly valuable since foreign regimes deal primarily with international
cases-the very area in which our need for guidance is greatest.
Moreover, it is a truism of comparative studies that considering foreign law has a
salutary effect on understanding one's own. To give an example, for decades
American courts have struggled with the extraterritorial application of federal statutes
under the heading of (subject matter)jurisdiction.' This wrong-headed approach has
caused endless confusion. A look at foreign conflicts rules would have shown that
this is really a choice-of-law problem, albeit a peculiar one, as Justice Scalia finally
recognized." European conflicts lawyers have known this problem for decades under
the label of "mandatory rules."6 At minimum, comparative studies can clarify such
J. CoMP. L. 187 (1989). For a translation, see Jean-Claude Cornu et al., Swiss Statute on
Private International Law of Dec. 18, 1987, 37 AM. J. CoMP. L. 193 (1989).
62. See Schets van een Algemene Wet betreffende het Internationaal Privaatrecht (Draft
of General Law Concerning International Law) (Netherlands 1993), reprinted in 1993
WEEKBLAD VOOR PRIVAATRECHT, NORTARIAAT & REGISTRATIE 605.
63. See Contracts (Applicable Law) Act, 1990, ch. 36 (Eng.); Private International Law
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1995, ch. 42 (Eng.); Civil Jurisdiction and Judgements Act,
1982, ch. 27 (Eng.).
64. See Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, Sept. 27, 1968, 1990 O.J. (C 189) 2 (consolidated); Convention on the
Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, June 9, 1980, 1980 O.J. (L 266) 1 [hereinafter
Rome Convention].
65. See, e.g., Tung-Pi Chen, Private International Law of the People's Republic of China:
An Overview, 35 AM. J. COMP. L. 445 (1987); Friedrich K. Juenger, Contract Choice of Law
in the Americas, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 195, 199 (1997); Friedrich K. Juenger, The Inter-
American Convention on the LawApplicable to International Contracts: Some Highlights and
Comparisons, 42 AM. J. CoMP. L. 381 (1994); Chin Kim, New Japanese Private International
Law: The 1990 Horei, 40 AM. J. CoMw. L. 1 (1992); see also CODE CivIL arts. 3076-3168
(Que.).
66. See, e.g., Mannington Mills v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1291-92 (3d Cir.
1979); Timberland Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 608-15 (9th Cir. 1976);
Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1333-35 (2d Cir. 1972).
These, and many other opinions, treated the applicability of the federal statutes on which the
respective actions were based as amatterof federaljurisdiction under28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994).
67. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 812-14 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(explaining that the applicability of the Sherman Act is not an issue of federal jurisdiction but
of "jurisdiction to prescribe").
68. The problem is addressed in article 7, section I of the Rome Convention, supra note
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issues, and clarity is a virtue when it comes to restating the law.
Finally, looking abroad would also help the drafters of a new restatement to
produce a document that is in touch with worldwide trends. This does not mean that
they should sacrifice American principles and rules simply in order to join the
bandwagon; there may be good reasons not to do so. But at least they should make
informed and intelligent choices in this regard. To take an obvious example, if they
recognize that some American jurisdictional principles are highly idiosyncratic and
thus unacceptable to other countries, they will have to decide whether their
advantages at home are worth the risk of alienation and of nonrecognition of
American judgments abroad. 9 Or, to provide an illustration pointing in the opposite
direction, ifthey perceive that the SecondRestatement' s most-significant-relationship
approach is very similar to many modem choice-of-law models abroad, and that the
basic idea is gaining in worldwide acceptance,"0 they are likely to find themselves
encouraged to preserve it.
My last, and most heretic, wish is that the drafting team for a third restatement
include foreign advisers. This requires neither a particularly large number of
additional members nor their constant presence at the working sessions. It would
suffice if experts representing our most important trading partners as well as the
major regions in the world were consulted on a regular basis. Their involvement
would safeguard the consideration of foreign experience that I have advocated
above.7 Perhaps even more importantly, such experts could also provide feedback
as to how American conflicts rules are likely to be perceived abroad. They could help
us to draft rules that do not cause misunderstandings, frictions, or trigger outright
rejection in other countries. The more agreeable, or at least tolerable, or at the very
least understandable these rules are to non-Americans, the smoother the resolution of
conflicts cases on an international level will be. After all, handling conflicts issues
without regard for their perception abroad invites discord while considering foreign
views engenders cooperation.72 As the number of transboundary disputes increases,
64, 1980 O.J. (L 266) at 3. On the issue of mandatory rules, as well as the various terms used
in other languages, as well as for further references, see REIMANN, supra note 48, at 28-30.
Whether European private international law has developed better solutions for the underlying
problem than American conflicts law is, of course, a different question.
69. This is particularly true with regard to in personam jurisdiction on the basis of
continuous and systematic contacts (doing business within a jurisdiction). See Patrick J.
Borchers, Comparing Personal Jurisdiction in the United States and the European
Community: Lessons for American Reform, 40 AM. J. COMp. L. 121, 135-37 (1992). For
personal jurisdiction based on in-state service of process (tag jurisdiction), see Peter Hay,
Transient Jurisdiction, Especially over International Defendants, 1990 U. ILL. L. REv. 593,
599-603.
70. See Mathias Reimann, Savigny's Triumph? Choice of Law in Contracts Cases at the
Close of the Twentieth Century, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 571, 572-73 (1999).
71. As every comparative lawyer knows, it is dangerous to rely solely on statutory texts and
scholarly books becausethey are too easily misunderstood, particularly when written in foreign
languages. And as every American trial lawyer knows, you want live witnesses for the
immediacy of their testimony as well as for the opportunity of cross-examination.
72. The aggressive extension of American regulatory and procedural measures beyond
United States borders has engendered considerable alienation in foreign countries in the past.
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international cooperation becomes ever more important.
As a beneficial side-effect, foreign experts could provide valuable assistance in the
technical process of drafting, especially when they are from civil law countries. When
it comes to formulating (quasi-)statutory language, civilian jurists are often superior
to common lawyers, in part because the civilians have done it for centuries, and in
part because they take greater pride in clarity and conciseness. Few of those familiar
with codes and statutes on both sides of the Atlantic will deny this.73 I, for one, would
hope that the third restatement drafting team has at least one member trained in the
French tradition.
V. SOME ANSWERS IN CONCLUSION
The introductory paragraph of this article posed three questions: Is it time for a
third restatement? What would such a new restatement look like? And how should
we prepare and eventually draft it?63 Looking at these questions from the international
side of conflicts law helps to answer them.
The response to the question of timeliness is a cautious yes. Our current situation
in international conflicts disputes suggests that it is indeed time for a third
restatement. Over the last three decades, international lawsuits have grown vastly in
number as well as in importance but the Second Restatement is virtually silent on
most of the salient issues. At least in this regard, it is way out of date. Again, while
I think that the provincialism of the Second Restatement is a rather powerful reason
for working towards a successor, I am not contending that it is in and of itself
See, e.g., WALTHERJ. HABSCHEID, DER JUSTIZKONFLIKTMITDEN VEREINIGTEN STAATENVON
AMERIKA [THE JURISDICTION CONFLICT WITH THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA] (1986); see
also Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 708-16 (1988) (Brennan,
J., concurring) (emphasizing concerns of international comity and cooperation); Societd
Nationale Industrielle Adrospatiale v. United States, 482 U.S. 522, 547-68 (1987) (Blackmun,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (urging greater emphasis on international judicial
cooperation).
73. Those who are not convinced should compare section 187 of the Second Restatement
with article 3 of the Rome Convention, supra note 64, 1980 O.J. (L 266) at 2. Both deal with
choice-of-law clauses in contracts and their content is very similar. Yet, their style is very
different. Section 187 confounds the reader by convoluted language, double negatives,
exceptions and counter-exceptions; very few courts fully grasp it and it takes students one of
Professor Richman's flow charts to figure out what the section is trying to say. See William
M. Richman, Graphic Forms in Conflict ofLaws, 27 U. TOL. L. REv. 631,638 (1996). At least
by comparison, article 3 of the Rome Convention is straightforward, and one reading suffices
to understand what it means. Another illustration is how the Second Restatement and the Rome
Convention respectively handle escape devices. Both provide an exception from particular
choice-of-law rules if the most significant relationship is clearly with a state other than the one
chosen by the rule. The Second Restatement mind-numbingly repeats the very same language
a full nine times for contracts alone, see SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, §§ 189-197,
while the Rome Convention states it just once and for all, see Rome Convention, supra note
64, art. 4, § 5, cl. 2, 1980 O.J. (L 266) at 3. Further drafting problems are noted by Louise
Weinberg, A Structural Revision of the Conflicts Restatement, 75 IND. L. J. 475,477-83,486-
87 (2000).
63. See supra text accompanying note 1.
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sufficient to justify such a project. The present Restatement's inadequacy in
international issues is just one argument among many and should be weighed
accordingly.
My answer to the question what a third restatement should look like is only a
partial one because it deals merely with the international dimension. Yet, within these
limits, the response is confident and straightforward. A third restatement would have
to suit the needs ofmodem transnational litigation. Thus it would have to address the
issues that arise time and again in international cases.' These specifically
international issues need to be included even if it requires that we expand the
traditional boundaries of conflicts law.
Finally, as far as the preparation and drafting of a third restatement is concerned,
the needs of international litigation will require constant attention. Most importantly,
every principle and rule should be tested for fitness not only in the domestic, but also
in the international context. The drafters should work comparatively and seek the
input of foreign conflicts experts so as to maximize international harmonization and
cooperation. This will make their job more complex but it will also ensure a more
cosmopolitan work-product.
In the year 2000, the parochialism of the Second Restatement is embarrassing, but
at least it can be excused by the limited relevance of international issues at the time
ofthe document's gestation. Provincialism in a third restatement would be worse than
just embarrassing-it would render the whole project useless, if not dysfunctional,
for a large and ever growing share of future cases. And there would be no excuse
because the significance of international concerns today is as great as it is obvious.
We may not want to restate conflicts law all over again in the near future, but if we
do our product must fit the international age.
64. See supra text accompanying notes 29-34.

